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Abstract This research note focuses on the relationship between organised crime
and corruption in Italy. It is part of a wider research project investigating that
relationship across a number of European countries. In the first part of this
contribution, along with a brief account of definitional issues, a summary review of
previous work on the connections between organised crime and corruption is
provided. The paper then attempts to delineate the uniqueness of the Italian case
through some observations around the specific contours of organised and corrupt
exchange in the country as they manifest themselves. After a brief methodological
note, the analysis is interspersed with the opinions of key informants contacted for
this research who have profound knowledge of the subject matter, having worked for
many years as investigating judges or academic researchers. A division into areas in
which the links between organised crime and corruption are observed tries to map
the two phenomena and their joint modus operandi.
Introduction
The long history of the definition of organised crime is far from over [27]. This
specific from of criminality has been described by a number of North American
institutional agencies as ‘an alien threat’ and a ‘conspiracy to commit crimes for
profit on a continuing basis’ [19, 37]. However, the fact that organised criminal
activity is not necessarily organised crime has long complicated the definitional
process, while the adoption of concepts elaborated within strictly institutional
contexts has been harshly criticised [1, 2, 10, 13, 16, 60]. Traditionally, some
definitions hinge on mere quantitative aspects: the number of individuals involved in
a criminal group is said to determine the organisational degree of that group [25, 35].
Some others focus mainly on a temporal variable, that is the time-span during which
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illegal activities are conducted, or on the larger scale of the illegal operations carried
out when compared with conventional crime [34, 44]. Criminologists have also
focused on the specific ‘services’ provided by organised crime, be these protection
or trust, and on its purported evolution leading it from a predatory to a parasitic and,
finally, to a symbiotic stage [29, 41, 47]. It is felt that legal definitions and rigid
classificatory criteria may leave little space for nuanced studies, while proposed
definitions such as ‘serious crime’, which attempt to simplify the issue, are said to
produce an unwarranted narrowing of the analytical focus [64].
Corruption is commonly defined as abuse of public power for private profit and is said
to occur in the interface between economic interest and the political apparatus,
determining an inefficient use of resources [51]. Other definitions focus less on
‘inefficiency’ than on the illegality of the profits pursued and on the illegitimacy of the
conducts adopted. Corruption, however, may not limit its aim to the pursuit of profit and
wealth, but also to the acquisition of status or power [45]. Some authors categorise it by
degree of social acceptance and utilise a colour-coding system indicating as ‘white’
socially acceptable and ‘black’ as socially unacceptable episodes [31, 32]. Corruption
may be deemed systemic when is engrained in institutions and widespread in society to
the point of affecting the day-to-day interactions among citizens and between these and
their institutional representatives. By contrast, it may be described as sporadic when it
involves individuals who are swiftly identified and censored. The concept of ‘machine
politics’ has helped analysing corruption within the functionalist tradition, with authors
stressing that even ‘political rackets’ can satisfy ‘the needs of diverse subgroups in the
larger community which are not adequately satisfied by legally devised and culturally
approved social structures’ [42: 126]. Some scholars have argued that corruption is a
vestigial survival of the past, and is destined to be swept away by progress and
development [65]. Others have opted for an analysis of the economic costs of corruption
or for the specific victimisation processes that it engenders [50, 54].
As for the relationship between organised crime and corruption, this has been focused
upon in studies which emphasise the centrality of corrupt exchange for any organised
criminal activity. Corruption, therefore, may be seen as a major characteristic of
organised crime itself, as its provision of illicit goods and services needs some form of
connivance or protection on the part of official actors. Organised crime, moreover, may
attempt to corrupt representatives of institutional agencies with a view to avoiding
prosecution or to gaining access to markets and resources [28, 31, 39]. Authors have
also attempted, with debatable results, to link organised crime and corruption in a
statistical fashion, and to prove how both relate to the quality of the criminal justice
system and to the overall economic performance of specific countries [11, 63].
Against the backdrop of the literature summarily mentioned above, it is worth
locating the Italian case in some detail.
Background
Criminal organisations
For an understanding of organised crime in Italy, a preliminary distinction may be
useful. There are organisations mainly engaged in conventional illicit business, such
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as prostitution, gambling, smuggling, the supply of drugs, and so on. These
organisations are criminal enterprises or syndicates operating in illegal markets, in
the so-called underworld, where they promote, or respond to, demand for prohibited
goods. On the other hand, there are organisations which do not limit their operations
to the realm of illicit markets, but gain access to the overworld, namely to the official
economic and political spheres. The latter types of organisations, through their
simultaneous presence in legitimate and illegitimate domains, exert territorial control
and constitute ‘power systems’ which transcend conventional criminality. The very
phrase organised crime, in Italy, mainly refers to this latter type, exemplified by
organisations such as the Sicilian Mafia, the Camorra in the Campania region and the
‘Ndrangheta in the Calabria region. The relatively recent development of another
organisation operating in the Puglia region, the Sacra Corona Unita, is said to be the
outcome of the influence of the Camorra in the region, where local groups claimed and
slowly achieved independence from the Neapolitan organisation. It is controversial
whether the Sacra Corona Unita adopted the typical rituals characterising the ‘secret
brotherhoods’ from Sicily and Campania as the result of sheer mimicking, or whether
such rituals belonged to a pre-existent underworld subculture in the region [40]. It is
also hard to establish the degree to which this group operating in Puglia is capable of
forming partnerships with official economic and political actors like their counterparts
in Sicily and Campania. The groups that are certainly unable to do so are formed by
non-indigenous members or networks, over which a lot of investigative and scholarly
work is yet to be produced, and on which I shall return shortly.
With respect to the major Italian organisations, it should be noted that the
awareness of their constitution as ‘power systems’ dates back to the nineteenth
century. For example, in 1876, member of parliament Leopoldo Franchetti described
the mafia as a form of political crime promoted by sectors of the ruling class, namely
official political actors and businessmen. Elite groups were said to employ members
of the ‘military mafia’ and to use them as an illegal resource in their economic or
political activity. Violence was used for the discouragement of economic competitors
and the intimidation of political opponents [59]. The groups lending their strong arm
to official actors, in exchange, were granted a relative freedom to operate in other
illegal activities (mainly protection racket and contraband). Similarly, the Camorra,
at the time of the unification of the Italian peninsula (1860-61), was entrusted with
the task of maintaining public order, as the regular police had been sent to back up
Garibaldi’s army. The authority of the camorristi, in fact, became accepted by many
as the only power likely to guarantee order in a situation of war, when internal
conflict breaching every rule could easily take place. The Camorra was then playing
the role of a broker, acting as a mediator between a turbulent society and the official
authorities, a role destined to evolve significantly in the years to come [6, 9, 52].
These two examples provide enough material to suggest the following
conceptualisation. In order to identify the different interpretations of organised
crime, it is useful to refer to the concept of social organisation. This concept relates
to the variety of social relations which give rise to two types of networks. First,
social organisation can be viewed as an association, a network of individuals who
form some sort of culturally homogenous group. Second, social organisation can be
seen as a series of transactions, a network of individuals involved in a common
activity, whether or not they belong to the same association, in other words, whether
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or not they are socially and culturally homogenous. Transactions range from brief
encounters to elaborate, rigid, and highly coordinated undertakings. If we view
social organisation in terms of association, we emphasise the structure and internal
cohesiveness of groups. On the contrary, if we view social organisation in terms of
transactions we emphasise the structure and modality of joint activities.
Some scholars, but also investigators, choose the first route, thus describing the
criminal groups as separate entities constituted by cohesive enclaves and
characterised by specific cultural codes. Others opt for the second route, therefore
focusing on the links the criminal group establishes with external, mainly official
actors with whom joint activities are carried out (for this approach, among many
others, see Arlacchi [4, 5, 24, 38, 53]).
Those who choose the second route may highlight the capacity of organised crime to
polarise markets through the use of violence, thus implying that the ‘military’ aspects of
this type of crime are still very important. Others look specifically at the alliances and
partnerships between organised crime, the official economy and the political world, and
therefore suggest that organised crime combines forms of conventional criminality with
a variety of white collar offences. This happens, in particular, when proceeds from illicit
activities are invested in the official economy, where members of criminal groups are
said to ‘learn’ the techniques and the rationalisations of their white collar counterparts. In
this way, one could say, these groups do not corrupt markets, but they are corrupted by
them. In this perspective, it is more appropriate to talk about a number of exchanges, and
a mutual entrepreneurial promotion in which the different actors engage. In this sense,
the suggestion can be made that we are now faced with criminal networks, rather than
organised crime, which involve a number of actors from the legitimate as well as the
illegitimate world. These networks take advantage of the fact that in some sectors of the
official economy unorthodox practices and illegal behaviour are widespread. Criminal
networks imply the existence of interdependent units linked by a wide-ranging variety of
ties, including kinship, ethnicity, cultural homogeneity, social proximity, or simply
business partnership.
As alluded to earlier, this is not a recent development, and dates back to the nineteenth
century. Later, when sub-cultural theorists analysed organised crime, they too suggested
that the most successful criminal groups were those that managed to establish some form
of common interest with official actors (they meant the police, particularly). Only those
who did so could, in their view, really develop the scope and profits of their criminal
activity. The ability to operate in both the licit and the illicit arena allowed criminal
groups to develop those multiple affiliations which could ensure success in both. As [17]
put it: apprentice criminals pass from one status to another in the illegitimate
opportunity system, and as they do so, develop a set of relationships with members of
the legitimate world. Unless they can form these relationships, the possibility of a
stable, protected criminal style of life is effectively precluded.
Some observations must be made about indigenous and non-indigenous criminal
organisations. In the literature on organised crime, when the involvement of migrants
is examined, images and judgements recur which are often based on opinions,
hypotheses and moral panics. Some studies set off with the premise, reiterated and
transmitted without corroboration from one commentator to the next, that organised
crime formed by foreigners ‘is characterised by particular forms of aggression and
violence and the fast growth of their capacity to operate in different criminal areas’
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[23: 193]. It is very hard to establish of what this ‘particularity’ exactly consists,
especially in Italy where the violence and expansive force of indigenous organised
crime is a well-known fact. A more useful strategy, perhaps, consists of focusing on
some specific types of criminal activity, or on some specific geographical area, and
observe the interactions that organised criminal groups formed by migrants establish
with the new or traditional Italian organised groups. In a tentative manner, pending
further substantiation, we might suggest that in some Italian regions foreign
organised crime is independent from Italian criminal groups, because the latter are
by now engaged in productive, entrepreneurial and financial activities. Other specific
criminal sectors may have undergone a process of ‘succession’, whereby foreign
groups occupy the space left by Italian groups who have moved on to operate
elsewhere. In some cases, however, the succession is accompanied by the request by
Italian groups of a percentage on the profits made by the new comers [7, 8]. In other
areas, partnerships can be formed between Italian and non-Italian groups, with a
division of labour based on the respective power and on the capacity of the latter to
access the sources of illicit goods and substances. In yet other areas, non-Italian
groups are subordinate to Italian ones, particularly in contexts in which the demand
for illicit goods and services is traditionally high. In such cases, non-Italian groups
provide ‘criminal labour’ to established Italian ones. Finally, if we prefer to focus on
the specific criminal activity in which the different groups specialise, we might want
to investigate, for instance, whether the illegal transfer of people carried out by
Rumanians is to be associated with the demand for labour by the Italian hidden
economy; whether the ability of Russian groups to infiltrate the official economy is
due to the proven willingness by official actors to facilitate illicit infiltration; and
finally, whether the predominance of Chinese groups in the importation of forged
goods is the effect of the particular prosperity of this illicit economic sector in Italy.
In brief, the criminality of migrants in Italy should perhaps be analysed against the
background of the criminogenic characteristics of the country [57]. What remains
evident is that non-indigenous organised crime is confined to conventional criminal
activities, including theft, robbery, prostitution rackets, human trafficking, drug
distribution, and all other ancillary activities related to the above. Organised crime
involving migrants, in brief, remains a form of pariah organised crime. The
indigenous groups, instead, are in a position to control the major operations of
conventional criminality (mainly protection rackets and large drug operations) while
participating in the official economic and political worlds. It is in these worlds that
episodes of corruption occur which prompt the question: to what extent does
organised crime impact on the spreading of corrupt practices in the country?
Corruption
Nineteenth-century Italian criminologists were fully aware of the inclination of powerful
groups in the country to violate the law [55]. This should not sound surprising: most
members of the Positive School were politically left-leaning and warned that ‘the
bourgeois tyranny’ would soon deny human and civil rights to citizens (Pietro Ellero);
that the elite was giving shape to ‘new’ forms of criminality, more devastating than the
old ones (Cesare Lombroso); and that the ruling classes, with their contempt for
legality, would dictate the moral (or immoral) tone of the entire country (Enrico Ferri).
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In the annual report produced by the State Audit Board (theCorte dei Conti composed
by judges who advise the Treasury) in 2008, there was no sign that corruption, through
payments given to politicians by entrepreneurs in exchange for public contracts, was
subsiding (Il Sole 24 Ore, 4 February 2008). The most worrying aspect underlined by
the Board, however, was the reiterated practice of granting amnesties to those charged
with corrupt behaviour, who are in this way regularly rescued before a criminal
sentence can be pronounced. Similar concerns were expressed by the Anti-Corruption
High Commissioner, who stressed that statistics indicating a decline in the reported
cases were not a signal of the decline of the phenomenon, but rather of the growing
tolerance towards it. Incidentally, the recent programme aimed at simplifying and
shrinking the national bureaucratic apparatus included, among other measures, the
suppression of the figure of High Commissioner [62].
Transparency International, in March 2009, remarked that in Italy corruption is
the only industry that does not experience a crisis. In the year 2002, the country was
listed at the 31st place in the table drawn through the ‘perceived corruption index’,
while in 2008 it was placed at the 55th place. With regard to the ‘bribe payers
index’, Italy also occupied a low position: 17th out of 22 countries. This index
measures the propensity of companies from the top industrialised countries to use
corrupt methods when operating abroad. The argument was also made that, given the
current economic crisis, and given the state’s intention to inject money into a variety
of public works which may encourage productive recovery, corruption may increase
as a consequence. Enterprises and political representatives were said to be poised to
take advantage of such imminent opportunities. A new Bill discussed in Parliament
about banning the use of telephone tapping for investigations concerning corruption
was also seen as a new incentive for perpetrators. Finally, a strong antidote to
corruption was identified, as usual, in market competition.
It is indeed around the variable ‘competition’ that many episodes of corrupt exchange
can be grouped. A typical, sensational, example, is offered by the scandal of the Bank of
Italy. The type of illegal conduct adopted by the Bank shows how powerful groups and
individuals may violate their own rules and philosophies. While officially adhering to
the liberal principles of competition, general director Antonio Fazio accepted the bid
made by banker Gianpiero Fiorani, despite the fact that a non-Italian competitor had
made a more advantageous offer to buy the Antonveneta Bank. Behind the national
sentiment mobilised by Fazio in explaining his choice, there emerged a long-term
partnership between him and Fiorani in numerous mutually-enhancing financial
operations [61]. This case shows how the official advocates of market freedom, in
fact, do not genuinely believe in the benefits of such freedom.
Methodological note
Having set the background, it is necessary to specify the source of the information
collected below. The analysis that follows is based on
a) judicial documents, namely documents produced by courts on proven cases
leading to guilty verdicts and consequent penal sentences;
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b) journalist sources discussing proven cases or ongoing investigations and judicial
activity;
c) academic work discussing the above or analysing general issues around the
causes and persistence of both corruption and organised crime;
d) interviews with five key informants.
Interviews were conducted with three judges, respectively a long-term mafia
investigative judge (J1), an experienced investigative judge working in the
Campania region (J2) and a judge sitting on the national Council of Magistrates,
Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura, (J3). The other two key informants were
senior academics based at the University of Palermo and the University of Turin
respectively (A1, A2). All five informants are also known authors, as they have
produced a variety of publications in the form of books and articles on the subject
matter. Interviews were semi-structured and only some themes and areas were
initially established, namely the specific sectors of social and institutional life in
which organised crime and corruption can be read jointly. As the interviews
proceeded, of course, the specific experience of the informants, their knowledge
accumulated in investigative or research work, came to the fore and influenced the
direction of the conversations with this author, yielding supplementary information
in a serendipitous fashion. The interviewees were willing to participate in the project
and were assured that their identities would not be revealed.
Findings
Corruption
The Bank of Italy case briefly described above possesses a number of traits with
cases that occurred during the early 1990s and that can be grouped under the same
typology. Such cases came to light during the long season of the anti-corruption
judicial initiative known in Italy as ‘clean hands’ [12, 21, 46, 49]. Informant J3
recalled those years in the following terms:
‘In the administrative and political sector corruption is systemic. We have seen
numerous examples since the 1970s. What became a paradigmatic case
revolved around the interests of the oil producing companies in Italy. These
companies devised a well organised system of corruption aimed at represen-
tatives of all political parties. They managed, in this way, to involve part of the
parliament in passing a law which was blatantly favourable to them in
financial terms. During the ‘clean hands’ operations, it emerged that the
money destined by the construction entrepreneurs for the corruption of
national and local politicians was part of the budget, it was an item in their
accounts, although this did not appear in the official balance sheets of their
companies’ (J3).
The ‘clean hands’ phase ended in the 1990s with yet another sensational case.
Lawyer David Mills was accused of receiving some 500,000 euros from Silvio
Berlusconi in return for giving false evidence in two corruption trials involving the
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Italian prime minister. Only in February 2009 was Mills found guilty and given a
four and a half year sentence, though he remains free pending appeal. In the
document released by the court to explain the motivation of the sentence, the
description is provided of
‘the direct involvement of Berlusconi in the creation of 64 offshore companies
through which various illicit funds were channelled, including the 12 million dollar
pay-off that the Socialist leader Bettino Craxi received for approving the legislation
that allowed Berlusconi to take more or less untrammelled control of the Italian
airwaves’ [36: 23].
In an additional comment by informant A1, ‘The current prime minister has
managed to escape the trial because he passed a law giving the country’s four
highest office-holders immunity from prosecution, without which he would now be
heading for a prison cell alongside Mills’ (A1).
With the new millennium, while lesser attention is devoted by academics to
corrupt exchange, judicial and journalistic sources indicate an exacerbation rather
than an attenuation of the phenomenon, although the dynamics and format of
corrupt exchange appear to become increasingly diversified. The following is a
limited sample of cases reported by the media over the last year [56, 58];
Ministero [43].
– In Milan a local councillor working in the office for the protection of the
environment builds a house, without applying for a building licence, in a
protected area.
– A lawyer operating in Milan, former member of the board of directors of
Parmalat and La Scala Theatre, is arrested for acting as a straw man for a
criminal organisation: he accepted to appear as the owner of properties and
financial assets actually belonging to the organisation.
– In Rome, several medical doctors are criminally charged because they dispense
unnecessary therapies to patients with the only aim of claiming state
reimbursement. The fraud costs the Italian state around 10 M euros. Similarly,
in Milan, some surgeons are arrested for performing undue operations merely
with a view to claiming state funds.
– A case coming to light in Florence indicates that municipal areas destined for
public use are instead sold to urban developers in exchange for bribes.
– In Turin, a number of pharmaceutical companies are accused of bribing
politicians in order to obtain licences for the sale of useless medicines and to
outflank laboratory control about their hazardous nature.
– The governor of the Abruzzo region is arrested for requiring payments from
entrepreneurs delivering services to the local health system.
– In Naples, a businessman is arrested for virtually monopolising contracts in
several public sectors thanks to his connections with local politicians.
– In Turin, an investigative judge devises a network of fake consultancy
companies run by friends or accomplices, claiming the expenses (from the
state) for consultancy work than in fact is never carried out. A paradoxical
aspect of this case is that this judge had previously conducted investigations on
episodes of corruption occurring in the world of football, and it is reasonable to
assume that, while unveiling the corruption of others, he was practising his own.
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– Some major energy and telephone companies (including Telecom Italia) are
heavily fined for fraud against consumers and malpractice against competitors.
– A case that gained international resonance occurred in Naples in 2008. The
companies contracted with the building of a waste disposal facility were unable
to complete the work by the agreed deadline. The contract had been won
through unorthodox practices and with a totally unrealistic bid, offering the
required service for extremely low, therefore dubious, prices. The ineptitude of
the company contracted led to the infamous ‘rubbish emergency’.
Corruption and organised crime
The cases listed above cover a number of areas that criminologists would describe as
grey areas in which politics, business and crime interact in various fashions.
According to informant A1:
‘Corruption in Italy does not reveal the direct participation of organised crime
such as, for example, the mafia. Rather, it shows the spreading of a “mafia
method” in conducting business and doing politics. I have studied the
processes of transformation of the Sicilian mafia for many years. I was
interested in cultural aspects, namely in the way in which values and codes are
transmitted in basic social interactions, and how they colonise other life
ambits. This cultural approach led me to look, first, at how women were
involved or connived with the organisation. I then moved on to the political
world, to see how public representatives assimilated elements of the mafia
culture. Finally, I am now looking at how the “mafia method” is becoming the
prevailing method inspiring the crimes of the powerful and how it affects
market freedom and the democratic system as a whole’ (A1).
Similar description was given by informant J1, who noted that environments
saturated by corrupt exchange offer everybody a chance to ‘have a go’. In his view,
corruption in Italy is characterised by a multiplying effect which is felt in all
positions of the social hierarchy: ‘corrupt exchange involving the elite and that
involving ordinary citizens feed upon each other’. As corruption spreads from the
elite downwards to other social groups, impunity seems to increase its multiplying
effect. This process causes increasing familiarisation and tolerance with unorthodox
practices, even among those who benefit very little from their own corrupt practices.
‘The opportunities granted to ordinary citizens to benefit from minor episodes
of corruption led to the partial condoning of large-scale corruption. The
tolerance of petty immorality on the part of the elite paved the way for the
acceptance of their own higher immorality by the non-elite. The moral tone of
the country, however, was imposed by the ruling class, who by relentlessly
displaying their own corruption made everyone indifferent to official rules and
cynical towards the public welfare’ (J1).
The stages of this process were addressed by informant A1, who noted that during
the 1970s corruption seemed to be confined to the margins of civil society, namely
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within a sub-system which had few occasions to interact with society as a whole.
News about a state functionary being corrupt would cause a scandal, while
corruption of entrepreneurs or politicians was not even contemplated, because it
was not brought to the limelight, therefore it did not exist.
‘In Italy, I believe things have changed from the early 1970s, when the first
journalistic and judicial investigations drew some light on the adventurous
corrupt mixture of professionals, politicians, businessmen and organised
crime. The relationships between all these actors deform the norms that should
govern society, politics and the economy. This is when we discovered that there
was not a big distance between those who corrupt, those who are corrupted,
and civil society. The idea that there are parallel worlds, distinct and separate,
was a delusion. As it is a delusion to think that there is one professional sector
more or less immune than others to corrupt practices’ (A1).
This aspect was also highlighted by the organisation ‘[33], that informs consumers
on their rights. After indicating, for the previous year, the figure of 70 billion euros as
the loss of the Italian state for corrupt practices, the organisation warned that all social
sectors were getting accustomed to a ‘culture of corruption’ and that indignation for
such culture was slowly fading. No specific responsibility for corruption was
apportioned to organised crime, as the regions in which the growth of the phenomenon
was observed were not those in which organised crime traditionally operates.
According to J2, criminal organisations such as the mafia are the most visible
version of a way of exercising power. Members of the mafia ‘are used by the state,
they are protected, and then, when they are no longer needed, they are dumped’. In
this perspective, ‘if we want to understand the relationship between corruption and
organised crime we have to rid ourselves of all the stereotypes and prejudices, and
look at these phenomena against the background of the power elite’ (J2).
This informant qualified his view by arguing that political activity has by now
become a straightforward form of business, in which individuals and groups are
connected in a pyramidal configuration. These connections are national, and often,
international expressions of power, global systems based on the control by the few
upon the many. ‘This is organised abuse of power, which causes injustice and social
suffering. This pyramidal configuration offers some space to organised crime’ (J2).
In this perspective, therefore, organised crime uses corruption because everyone else
does. A people is what a ruling class makes it, said J2 echoing Rousseau. A ruling
class that degrades the people is in turn degraded by it in a vicious circle. ‘The ruling
class rules also the formation of public opinion, it selects the collective memory, it
chooses which values are to be regarded as important. Organised crime just follows
the general climate determined by the ruling class’ (J2).
In the view of J3, instead, the institutional actors who are more vulnerable to
corruption by organised crime are local politicians and administrators. These actors
handle public resources, are geographically close to organised criminal groups, and
operate in the same social environment, therefore they are subject to the pressure that
such groups exert. At the local level, however, corrupt exchange ‘proposed’ by
organised crime to politicians is accompanied by an implicit degree of intimidation
which determines the outcome of the proposal made. Informant A1, in this respect,
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talked about the well known ‘offers that cannot be refused’. ‘In other words, it is
possible that a corrupt offer is rejected, but then intimidation follows against the
person who does not want to be corrupted. The outcome will be the same, namely
the illegal result that was initially pursued. In such cases, before even attempting to
corrupt, organised crime aims to intimidate. At times, acceptance of a corrupt
proposal may turn into quasi-affiliation with the organised group’ (A1).
Informants also stressed that when organised crime manages to corrupt any actor, this is
due to the low professional ethics of those who make themselves available to corruption.
‘There is little sense of responsibility for the role one occupies, be it public or
private. This may be difficult to evaluate in empirical terms, but the deficit of
political and civic culture in a country exposes citizens to systemic corruption,
by organised crime, but also by other individuals and groups. In such contexts,
even emulation—the desire to access prestigious positions and gain more
financial resources than one holds—may become a significant variable’ (A2).
Emulation, as mentioned by this informant, plays a role in tax evasion, whereby
small earners feel legitimised to escape their dues to the state when witnessing the
spectacle of massive illegality by the elite. Tax evasion in Italy reaches such level
that the state, regularly, proposes ‘social pacts’ or amnesties requiring the payment of
at least a portion of the unpaid sums. Vulnerability to corruption, ultimately, may
also be exacerbated by impunity, namely the certainty that there will be no
prosecution. Except for the period of ‘clean hands’, corrupted and corruptors have
rarely been punished, judicially as well as morally [22].
Corrupt sectors
Fraud against the state shows the most remarkable expansion among other corrupt
practices. This includes a range of false claims for financial entitlements and special state
support, or consist of payment requests for fictitiouswork performed or incomplete services
delivered [20]. These practices went up during the last 2 years by 40% and 200%
respectively [3]. The increase is not solely due to the growing interest of organised crime
in state funds, but also to the spreading of fraudulent conducts among professionals,
administrators and private firms (see the list of recent cases provided above).
A corollary of this sector is constituted by fraud against the European Union. In
2007 some 6,000 irregularities were reported to the European Fraud Prevention
Office by member state agencies [48]. The European budget attracts professionals,
criminal groups and opportunistic entrepreneurs who may resort to fraud as a means
of rescuing a failing company or expanding its business. It is hard to establish how
many of these irregularities were committed by Italian actors, let alone how many by
Italian criminal groups. What is of interest, in this respect, is a case brought to light
by investigative journalists, who tracked a company operating in Trapani (Sicily)
specialising in the construction of wind turbines financed by the EU. The turbines
producing alternative energy are now spread across Sicily, but only seven out of
thirty-three of these ecologically-friendly wind farms are actually functioning. Most
turbines just stand there, unconnected to any machinery transforming the wind into
energy [30].
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Returning to the national level, the construction sector is another of the sectors
particularly exposed to corruption. The involvement of organised crime, here, may
cover a plurality of industrial segments, ranging from the production of cement to
the building and refinement of the constructions commissioned. Licit entrepreneurs
are also involved, particularly in areas where environmental planning is vague,
control regulations are weak, and administrators are willing to help developers by
claiming that the areas sold are destined for private dwellings.
In the sector of public works the formation of cartels is frequent. Auctions and
tenders relating to such works are manipulated, and when organised crime is
involved the employment of ‘clean’ business partners and professionals becomes
necessary. According to informant J1:
‘White collars and organised criminals, in this sector operate jointly. They may
even identify which service has to be put out to tender and what type of good
has to be delivered. So, basically, the contract gained will not serve a specific
need of the community, but only the financial interests of those contracted.
When planning what type of service has to be contracted out, the role of
politicians is crucial. Subsequently, corruption may occur when the criteria for
the granting of the contract have to be established. Those manipulating the
tendering process will make sure that their competitors do not meet the
criteria. When the bid is presented, the situation may arise where there is only
one company left in the contest, although the winner will make a series of bids
as if other companies were still competing’ (J1).
Finally, at the execution phase, the winner may sub-contract parts of the works to
a friendly firm. If the bid made is low and unrealistic, the winning company may
even plan not to complete the works for lack of sufficient funds. The ‘rubbish
emergency’ listed among the cases above is one such case, where the failure of the
legitimate entrepreneurs to honour a contract gave the opportunity to organised
crime to offer its own, alternative disposal services. Similarly, companies failing to
perform the tasks for which they have been paid may resort to sub-contracts with
firms controlled by organised crime.
The sector of public contracts constitutes an extremely important area for the
economy of the country. ‘Through public contracts, the state guarantees the realisation
of infrastructures and the delivery of services to citizens. This is an essential function to
encourage development and remove the economic and social obstacles limiting the
freedom and equality of citizens’ [15: 7]. The allocation of public contracts, however,
needs impartial, efficient, and morally reliable administrators, who hand over public
resources to those who are actually able to deliver at the appropriate standard and,
simultaneously, at the minimum cost for the collectivity. Where such administrators
are wanting, chances are offered to adventurous entrepreneurs and organised crime.
Public contracts are attractive for a number of reasons. First, they represent an
important part of the resources available in specific contexts, particularly in regions in
which private entrepreneurship is insufficiently developed [18]. In Calabria, for
instance, public finances constitute 80% of the financial assets available in the region.
Second, fraudulent conduct in the arena of public contracts is met with particular
leniency by institutional agencies, and when organised crime is involved, inves-
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tigations require complex tools and skills. Organised criminals turned into business-
men, therefore, may opt for this area of investment for the excellent prospects it offers
in terms of revenues and for the negligible risk of apprehension. Third, public
contracts are managed by vulnerable and inefficient public administrators, and have
long been characterised by unorthodox behaviour and corrupt exchange between
private entrepreneurs, political representatives and public administrators.
‘The infiltration of mafia organisations is therefore favoured by the spreading of illicit
conduct and corruption within the public administration itself. Such an environment is
more permeable to the presence of actors who are associated with criminal organisations
due to the low level of legality that characterises them’ [14: 8].
Finally, criminal organisations may benefit form public contracts in terms of
prestige and power in the territories they control. For example, they may realistically
play the role of employers, whether for their affiliates or for members of the general
population. They may gain access to the business world, encountering peers and
colleagues who may be helpful in future enterprises. In brief, they may progress in
their career combining involvement in licit as well as illicit markets. Even when
organised criminal groups do not succeed in gaining contracts, they act as mediators
for other companies, activating their political relationships or their ‘persuasive’
means. In some cases, it is the winning company which will contact a criminal
organisations, ‘in order to agree in advance on the protection money due, thus
avoiding future problems when works are in progress’ (ibid: 8).
‘The phenomenon of criminal infiltration is distributed equally across the regions
of the South of Italy. It is, however, mainly concentrated in Calabria and Sicily, and
in some provinces of Campania: Caserta and Naples. The situation is critical in
Calabria, where the ‘Ndrangheta has enjoyed until very recently little attention by
public opinion and institutions. This has allowed it to expand beyond the Calabrese
territory. Today the situation has changed and, as happened in Sicily after the
massacre of judges and in Campania with the camorra wars, the Calabrese
organisation too is at the centre of numerous investigations’ (ibid: 127).
Targeted institutions
Corruption of the justice system, including administrative staff, publicly appointed
officials and judges, increased between 2005 and 2007 [33]. The increase, however,
may not be statistically significant, as the cases of corruption were 8 in 2005 and 10
in 2007. What may be of interest is in which Italian region such cases occurred:
Emilia Romagna, Lazio and Lombardy, namely in regions in which organised crime
activity is not as prevalent as elsewhere. Judiciary corruption, therefore, can be
mainly imputed to white collar offenders, either in the political or in the economic
sphere. Some commentators, however, suggest that the increase signals both the
‘migration’ of organised crime to other regions and the spreading of the ‘mafia
method’ throughout the country. According to A2:
‘The police and the judiciary seem less permeable to corruption, also because
they can rely on a higher degree of internal cohesion and have a distinctive
ésprit de corps. Unlike for politicians and administrators, the career of police
and judges can hardly be influenced by organised crime, whose power to
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corrupt, after all, consists in large measure of paying money. Finally, they are
less vulnerable to intimidation, because they feel protected by their peers, they
are more homogenous and less competitive with one another’ (A2).
The corruption of the judiciary, according to J1, is associated with the inefficient and
particularly lengthy investigation processes. Judges are given a precise deadline by
which investigation has to be completed so that prosecution may commence. Failure to
meet the deadline results in the offence being cancelled. Corrupt judges may prolong
the times of the investigation on purpose, thus favouring the release of defendants.
A well know case in Italy, involving judge Carnevale, resulted in the Court of
Cassation invalidating all the previous trials in which mafia members had been
found guilty. The invalidation was motivated with some procedural irregularities.
The judge, eventually, was prosecuted and expelled from the judiciary.
Informant J1 mentioned cases in which police officers were in good working
relationships with people who were on the run from justice, or with people who were
in the process of being arrested or investigated. ‘These officers, therefore, informed
members of the criminal world that something was going to happen to them, giving
them time to hide, destroy documents or find an alibi’. In such cases, J1 added, sub-
cultural factors play an important role, as ‘the police officers may share a background
of bullying, violence and criminality with the ones they are supposed to police’.
Informant J2 argued that all forms of stacking resources, be they private or public,
imply a certain degree of corruption. The political world is central in this respect. The
fact is, he said, that ‘In politics, many people find a solution to their economic
problems, and they try to occupy all the possible places where resources are
distributed. Around elected politicians there are then cohorts of allies who participate
in political activity and share some of the wealth. Finally, at the bottom, there are the
masses, the subjects who sustain the whole system on their shoulders’ (J2).
This informant was reluctant to assert that the political system is corrupted by
organised crime. He would rather claim that organised crime takes advantage of a
corrupt and inefficient system.
‘Take the example of the public financing of political parties. This was introduced
after the scandals proved that businessmen (oil producer, developers, the
pharmaceutical industry, and many more) were receiving favours from politicians
in exchange for money. These favours consisted in pieces of legislation that
brought enormous amounts of money to entrepreneurs. The new law on the public
funding of political parties was supposed to make the costs of political activity
more transparent. But it was a big lie: politicians and economic actors continued
with the occult financing of one another. The result now is that, while occult
financing continues, we have the European most expensive public system of
pouring money into politics, with even small parties (who do not have a significant
number of representatives) receiving exorbitant amounts of money. Organised
crime, in all this, is just one of the many actors involved; they appropriate
resources like everybody else’ (J2).
This view was shared by A2, who considers the political sphere the most
vulnerable to corruption by organised crime. This is because power groups tend to
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come together irrespective of the nature of the power they exercise. Politicians
collude for the obvious reason that organised crime controls votes, particularly at the
local level. From the point of view of organised crime, on the other hand, corruption
does not only lead to the control of contracts and resources, but also to an expansion
of influence and power.
We have seen in the sections above the role played by politicians and
administrators in the arena of public contracts. A brief addiction to the information
already presented, came form informant A2, who argued that administrators are
accustomed to exchanging favours for illegal income, due to the general climate in
which they find themselves operating. Some of them become public administrators
on the basis of nepotism or as a result of some corrupt exchange of sort. Posts in the
public administration may be distributed by influential figures, with the participation
of political parties claiming their own share of jobs for their faithful members. Once
in post, administrators are surrounded by ‘clients’ of varied nature, friends and
relatives, colleagues and acquaintances who formulate incessant requests and
propose creative bargains. ‘Organised crime swims at ease in such corrupt waters.
And administrators will be unable or unwilling to determine whether the companies
they entrust with a public work is owned by a clean entrepreneur, a criminal one, or
a partnership between the two’ (A2).
Informants concurred that in the south of the country administrative corruption is
more visible. In the southern regions, investigations focusing on organised crime
lead to the discovery that somewhere, behind the scenes, there is a local
administrator or a politician, and that in proximity lies a businessman: the labyrinth
of power and business emerges very clearly. However,
‘In the north of the country power is just as corrupt, with a relatively lower
presence of organised crime. The problem is that it is no longer possible to
distinguish between organised crime and white collar crime’ (J2).
According to A2 the private sector occupies third position in the corruption
echelon. Entrepreneurs were deemed lacking a proper ethic of the market, and prone
to grasp any possibility of operating in monopoly conditions. ‘Escaping competition
has become acceptable, and for some, in a sense, even legal’. In a qualification
adding to statements reported above:
‘In some contexts the criminal can turn into a private entrepreneur. He
will conduct a series of legitimate activities with the illicit money
accumulated. Also, the criminal may have to employ those affiliated with
his organisation, and therefore give salaries in licit occupations. The
mafia is an employer, let us not forget. Moreover, organised crime is a
money lending organisation, and at times, when the debtors become
insolvent, their business is appropriated by the lending organisation. This
is one of the other ways in which organised crime gains access to the
official economy’ (A2).
While informant J1 felt that organised crime turned into business, thanks to the
support of politicians, can renounce intimidation, J2 dwelt again on the general
economic practices prevailing in the country. In his view all economic sectors are
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corrupt: ALL! At all levels of their respective hierarchy. The reason for this
generalised diffusion of corrupt exchange is that:
‘We have now a criminal system that works by inertia: it has its own inherent
motion. We have a system which is integrated, composed of different
characters and entities, not all of which have criminal professionalism. We
have the politician, the high public manager, the entrepreneur, the financier,
the mediator, the representative of the institutions, and at times a represen-
tative of the mafia. The system is modular, in the sense that, according to the
circumstances, it includes new actors and excludes others’ (J2).
To remedy this situation is extremely hard. Even whistleblowers, in the private
sector, do not function as examples to others. They are often ostracised, while the
corrupt are still seen in the most glamorous public events and on TV. This is the
result of the organic partnerships between business, politicians and organised crime.
We are faced with post-mafia organisations, in the sense that in the past we could
identify some figures of the official world who were ‘external’ allies of the mafia;
now it is the mafia which is external to the illicit business of the ruling elite.
‘Organised crime is not just a vile association of butchers led by shepherds
and peasants. It the mafia were composed only of semi-literate people it would
have been destroyed a long time ago. The problem is that the ruling class has
never managed to make the transition from a system based on wild and violent
accumulation to a social order respectful of legality based on shared values.
The elite in Italy has never really renounced violence. See the examples of state
terrorism scattered along the history of the country. The ruling class has
evolved from pre-modernity directly into post-modernity: this may explain the
strong relationship between corruption and organised crime’ (J2).
Conclusion
Corruption and organised crime in Italy are closely intertwined to the point that,
when investigating episodes of corruption the involvement of some criminal
organisation is discovered, and vice versa, when investigating the exploits of
organised crime, the involvement of some corrupt politician or entrepreneur often
comes to light. The relationship between corruption and organised crime in the
country, however, does not lend itself to conventional analyses imputing to the latter
the main responsibility for the spreading of the former. The opposite too seems to
obtain in Italy, where the claim can be safely made that widespread corruption within
the social, economic and political spheres attracts organised criminal groups,
encouraging them to participate in corrupt exchange and indirectly boosting their
other various illicit activities.
This research note has shown that corruption and organised crime, in Italy, are
connected in a variety of ways. With the political, administrative and private
sectors particularly prone to engage in corrupt exchange, illicit conduct tends to
spread to many other groups and actors. Upturning a liberalist metaphor, we could
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say that the elite has not promoted a ‘trickling down’ process whereby wealth is
distributed across the country, but has encouraged a process in which what
actually ‘trickles down’ is illegality. Organised crime is a participant in this
illegality, at times aided by intimidation, at times sustained by the interests of
legitimate actors who play a de facto role of partners. In such a situation resources
are not used to satisfy the needs of communities, but are appropriated through
personal initiative, individual risk, power, the ability to outflank rules and to
achieve impunity. Corrupt behaviour in Italy has slowly become acceptable at the
social level, to then gain legitimacy at the political, and finally at the legislative
level. Corruption has played the function of a foundational conduct, one that lends
itself to be imitated. It has altered the perception of what citizens should expect,
what they should pursue and how. It has taken on a ‘founding force’, namely the
capacity to impose a lifestyle, to transform the previous jurisprudence, to establish
new laws and new types of legitimacy. Corruption and organised crime, in sum, are
intertwined in a ‘criminal system’ that reproduces power, be it illicit or otherwise.
As Enrico Ferri [26] said more than a century ago:
‘Respect for the law spreads among the people less because of police and jails
than because of the example given by persons in high places and by the authorities
themselves, when they are first to put into practice respect for individual and social
right… Thus avoiding the scandals of impunity for the big thieves and the most
iniquitous severity for the little ones’.
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